Trabalho do Porto) had provided no elements from which it could be considered that the contested national provision was implementing EU law, the Court of Justice found itself without competence to decide on the preliminary reference.
VI
Notwithstanding the fact that the austerity measures included in the State Budget Act for 2012 were adopted after the bailout and in accordance with the MoU -a fact also 
1.2.
Bailout instruments such as the MoU have been considered the most important social source in the history of the EU (Kilpatrick 2014: 393) . Their implementation in Portugal heralded a dramatic erosion of social rights through the adoption of drastic cuts in a wide range of welfare allowances and in public investment in housing, education and health (Nogueira de Brito 2014: 68-73) . How is it then possible that the compatibility of the MoU with the EU´s social Constitution was never tested in court? In this article I argue that a systemic failure in the jurisdictional system of the EU immunized the MoU to any kind of judicial review. At the apex of the system, the Luxembourg court failed when it refused to answer the preliminary references submitted by Portuguese lower courts. The MoU was signed by an EU institution within the framework of EU legislation (section one). That means that it was a binding EU legal act that could be challenged on multiple EU law grounds (section two). By not tracing the genealogy of the austerity measures adopted by the Portuguese government to the MoU, the Court of Justice was simply nowhere to be seen during the bailout (section three). At the bottom of the jurisdictional system of the EU, Portuguese courts failed to properly identify EU legal acts that were the source of national budgetary provisions that foresaw austerity measures; moreover, they disregarded their role as common EU law courts of ordinary jurisdiction when they did not refer 
2.4.

Portuguese courts and the MoU
5.1.
One of the essential features of the jurisdictional system of EU is that it is organized according to the principle of subsidiarity (Piçarra and Pereira Coutinho 2012: 74). The
Treaty of Rome rejected the creation of a federal system of courts and instead gave the responsibility to apply EU law in the Member States to national courts, which thereby became 'ordinary courts of EU law.' IMF financing is based on a unilateral decision from the Executive Board of the IMF that specifies the terms and conditions of the loan:
'A Fund arrangement is a decision of the Executive Board by which a member is assured that it will be able to make purchases or receive disbursements from the Fund in accordance with the terms of the decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount. 'Whilst the Court has consistently held that, in the context of the application of Article (267 TFEU), it has no jurisdiction to decide whether a national provision is compatible with (EU) law, it may, none the less, extract from the wording of the questions formulated by the national court, and having regard to the facts stated by the latter, those elements which concern the interpretation of (EU) Given the importance of these preliminary references -they addressed measures that seriously affected the lives of millions -, the restrictive approach to admissibility adopted in these cases conflicts with the role of the Luxembourg court as the constitutional guardian of the rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU.
5.3.
The Portuguese Constitutional Court emerged during the financial crisis as a key player in the domestic political system when it had to address the compatibility with the 
Conclusion
The MoU specified bailout conditionality included in the Council implementing decision that authorized EU financial assistance to Portugal. It also contained obligations of the Portuguese State that stemmed from the excessive deficit procedure. Being EU law, -264/12, Fidelidade Mundial, EU:C:2014 :2036 , at 20. VIII ECJ, Case C-264/12, Fidelidade Mundial, EU:C:2014 :2036 , at 20, and ECJ, Case C-665/13, Via Directa, EU:C:2014 :2327 , at 14. IX ECJ, Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte, EU:C:2013 :149, para. 12, and ECJ, Case C-665/13, Via Directa, EU:C:2014 :2327 . X I will only marginally discuss the compatibility of the MoU with the Portuguese Constitution. Article 8 (4) of the Portuguese Constitution recognizes that the legal authority of EU law in the Portuguese legal order must be established according to the parameters laid out by the EU legal order, but also declares that such a recognition is not unconditional, as it must comply with the fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law. In other words, the Portuguese Constitution recognizes the primacy of EU law as long as both legal systems are compatible in systemic terms. That compatibility can be found in the mutual respect of the fundamental principles of a democratic rule of law, which I will argue were breached with the adoption of the MoU. However, any constitutional review of the MoU is conditioned to a previous assessment of its validity by the Court of Justice in a preliminary reference submitted by Portuguese courts. The safeguards require the drafting and implementation of a program of economic and financial reforms capable of correcting the macroeconomic imbalances that created maladjustments in the balance of payments. The program is negotiated and presented in a letter of intent addressed to the Fund´s Executive Board. In annex to that letter is usually included a memorandum that specifies the structural economic measures to be taken to correct imbalances and the key macroeconomic targets to be reached through the duration of the program. An IMF Executive Board decision named Stand-by Arrangement grants access to the Fund´s general resources during a specified period and up to a certain amount [Article XXX (b) ]. That access is conditioned to the accomplishment of certain macroeconomic objectives (quantitative performance criteria) and to the adoption of structural reforms that are crucial to the fulfillment of those objectives (structural benchmarks). Both the quantitative performance criteria and the structural benchmarks are included in the memorandum attached to the letter of intent sent by the State to the Executive Board. The first disbursement of the financial assistance is available immediately after the adoption of the Stanbyarrangement. Further disbursements are conditioned on a positive review by the Executive Board of the fulfillment of the conditionality included in the Stand-by Arrangement. See IMF Guidelines on Conditionality, para. 9 (Denters 2006: 196 (see OJ L 178, p. 15) . No legal consequences stem from this mistake because the Portuguese State is the sole addressee of the Decision (Article 5). According to Article 297 (2) ( §3) TFEU the effects of decisions are produced upon notification of the addressee. XXX The swiftness in the signature of the MoU was due to the fact that the first disbursement of the financial assistance was linked to its entry into force [Article 1 (4) Decision 344/2011/EU]. The emergency of the moment probably explains why the Council Implementing Decision is not numbered in the preamble of the MoU. XXXI On 3 May 2011, a slightly modified version of the MoU was signed between the Portuguese Government and the right-wing opposition parties (PPD/PSD and CDS/PP) (English version available at http://aventadores.files.wordpresscom/2011/05/memorando_troika-en.pdf). The bailout request was made just after the resignation of the Portuguese (Socialist) Government following the Parliament´s refusal to adopt further austerity measures included in a fourth version of the Stability and Growth Pact presented to Parliament on 23 March 2011. The commitment of the main opposition parties to the MoU was a requirement of the EU and the Eurogroup that is clearly underlined in the joint declaration of 8 April 2011, where it is stated that negotiations shall include those parties and calls for all political parties in Portugal to swiftly sign the MoU and confirm a new government in Parliament with the ability to fully adopt and implement the MoU. This declaration was made less than two months before Parliamentary elections in Portugal. Therefore, it may be regarded as an unlawful interference in the domestic affairs of the Portuguese State forbidden both by international law [Article 2 (7) This press release is just another example of the lack of transparency of bailout procedures. The Ecofin cannot act (or speak) on behalf of a mechanism of financial assistance that only includes Eurogroup Member States (the EFSF). 11) and savings of 195€ million in education (1.8) and 550€ million in the health-care system (1.10). XLIII In the pending Case T-531/14, Sotiropoulou, OJ C 351, the CFI will decide on a claim of a breach of the principles of conferral and subsidiarity in an action for damages brought against bailout Council decisions addressed to Greece. In 2010, the CFI rejected a similar action based on the applicants´ lack of direct concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. The Court considered, however, that the applicants had the possibility of attacking national implementing measures 'before the national courts and, in the context of that dispute, arguing that the contested (EU law) 
